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We study wage adjustment during the recent crisis in Italy using a unique data-
set on immigrant workers that includes those employed in formal and informal
sector. We ﬁnd that before the crisis immigrants’ wages in the formal and infor-
mal sectors moved in parallel (with a 15% premium in the formal labor market).
During the crisis, however, formal wages did not adjust down while wages in
the unregulated informal labor market fell so that by 2013 the gap had grown to
32%. The difference was particularly salient for workers in occupations where
the minimum wage is likely to be binding, and in “simple” occupations where
there is high substitutability between immigrant and native workers. Calibrating
a simple partial equilibrium model of spillovers between formal and informal
markets, we ﬁnd that less than 10% of workers who lost a formal job during
the crisis move to the informal sector. We also ﬁnd that if the formal sector
wages were fully ﬂexible, the decline in formal employment would be in the
range of 1.5–4.5%—much lower than 16% decline that we observe in the
data. (JEL E24, E26, J31, J61)
1. Introduction
The Great Recession has brought a substantial increase in unemployment
in Europe, with an average unemployment rate that has grown from 8% in
2008 to 12% in 2014. The change has been very heterogeneous. In north-
ern Europe, unemployment did not grow substantially or even fell: in
Germany, for example, unemployment rate actually declined from 7%
to 5%. At the same time, in Greece unemployment increased from 8%
to 26%, in Spain from 8% to 24%, and in Italy from 6% to 13%.
Why have unemployment dynamics been so different in European
countries? One of the most often cited explanations is the difference in
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labor market institutions that prevents wages from adjusting downward.
If wages cannot decline, negative aggregate demand shocks (such as the
Great Recession) result in unemployment growth. On the other hand, if
wages can fall, labor markets reach a new equilibrium with unemployment
rates returning to normal levels. Downward adjustment of wages in re-
sponse to macroeconomic shocks is especially important in the euro area
where labor markets cannot accommodate shocks through exchange rate
depreciation or through internal labor mobility (migration among EU
countries is much more limited than, for example, labor mobility across
US states).
Albeit straightforward, this argument is not easy to test empirically.
Indeed, cross-country studies of labor markets are subject to comparabil-
ity concerns. Another approach taken by the literature is comparing labor
markets in different industries within the same country, although compar-
ability issues still arise. In order to construct a convincing counterfactual
for a regulated labor market, one would need to study a nonregulated
labor market in the same sector within the same country. That is precisely
the scope of this article. We compare formal and informal labor markets
in Italy over the years 2001–13 considering informal employment as a
proxy for unregulated counterfactual to the regulated formal labor
market.1 We are able to carry out this analysis as we use a unique dataset
on immigrants who work both in formal and informal sector.2
We use a large annual survey of immigrants working in Lombardy
carried out by the Foundation for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-
Ethnicity (ISMU). Lombardy is the largest region of Italy in terms of
population (10 million people, or one sixth of Italy’s total) and GDP
(one ﬁfth of Italy’s total GDP). It is also the region with the largest mi-
grant population: in 2005, 23% of the entire migrant population legally
residing in Italy were registered in Lombardy. It is also likely to be the
largest host of undocumented migrants: in the last immigrants’ regular-
ization program in 2002, Lombardy accounted for 22% of amnesty ap-
plications. Although Lombardy has higher GDP per capita and lower
unemployment rates than the Italian average, it has also suffered from
the recent crisis. Unemployment increased from 4% in 2008 to almost 9%
in 2013. Recession started in 2009, it was followed by a weak recovery in
2010–11 and resumed in 2012; in 2012 real GDP was 5% below its 2008
level.
Our data cover around 4000 full-time workers every year, a ﬁfth of
which works in the informal sector. The dataset is therefore sufﬁciently
1. We deﬁne informal employment as employment without a legal work contract. We use
the term “informal” as a synonym of “underground” and “unofﬁcial.” A key assumption of
our analysis is that we consider the informal labor market to be less regulated than the formal
labor market.
2. Information on native workers’ informality status is not available from other datasets.
In the concluding remarks, we discuss the external validity of our ﬁndings.
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large to allow us comparing the evolution of wages in the formal and
informal sectors controlling for household characteristics, occupation,
skills, and other individual characteristics (age, gender, year of arrival
to Italy, and country of origin). We adopt a difference-in-differences
methodology in order to test our main hypothesis that a severe recession
in Italy (and Lombardy) should have resulted in a larger decline of wages
in the unregulated labor market (i.e. in the informal sector) compared with
the regulated labor market (i.e. the formal sector).
Our main result is presented in Figure 1 which shows the wage trends in
the formal and informal sectors controlling for occupation, gender, age,
education, country of origin, and family characteristics. We ﬁnd that the
wage differential between formal/regulated and informal/unregulated sec-
tors has increased after 2008. Moreover, although wages in the informal
sector decreased by about 20% in 2008–13, wages in the formal sector
virtually did not fall. This is consistent with the view of a substantial
downward stickiness of wages in the regulated labor market.
Importantly, before the recession, wages in the formal and informal sec-
tors moved in parallel—conﬁrming the validity of the parallel trends as-
sumption required for a difference-in-differences estimation and showing
that both regulated and unregulated labor markets have a similar degree
of upward ﬂexibility of wages.
In order to understand whether the downward stickiness of formal
wages is related to the minimum wage regulation, we construct sector-
speciﬁc minimum wages (using information from collective bargaining
contracts at the industry level). We ﬁnd that the effect in Figure 1 is
stronger for workers with earnings closer to the minimum wage, while
the effect disappears for workers earning far above the minimum wage.
Therefore, minimum wages do seem to at least partially explain the down-
ward stickiness of wages in the formal labor market.
We then test whether the effect is stronger in “simple” rather than in
“complex” occupations. The former require only generic skills and allow
for greater substitutability between workers (in particular, between na-
tives and immigrants) within occupations and across occupations. In such
jobs we should expect a greater downward adjustment in the absence of
regulation. On the contrary, in complex occupations workers need speciﬁc
skills and are harder to replace; therefore even in unregulated labor mar-
kets wages may not decline during recession. Our estimates are consistent
with this prediction: the increase in wage differential between formal and
informal sectors during the recession is stronger in simple than in complex
occupations.
We also analyze the impact of the crisis on formal and informal em-
ployment. We ﬁnd that formal employment decreases substantially,
whereas informal employment does not change.3 Since the aggregate
3. The drop in formal employment and the heterogeneity of effects on earnings by distance
from theminimumwage are consistent with the view that the regulations on ﬁring workers are
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demand shock affects both labor markets, the employment adjustment
implies that upon losing a job in the formal sector at least some workers
move to the informal sector. To disentangle this labor supply shock from
the negative demand shock associated with the Great Recession, we cali-
brate a simple partial equilibrium model describing such spillovers be-
tween formal and informal labor markets. Using the existing estimates
for demand and supply elasticities for the Italian labor market, we esti-
mate the degree of integration of formal and informal sector (i.e. the share
of workers who move from the formal to the informal labor market after
the crisis). Our model also allows to carry out a counterfactual analysis of
the formal sector’s response to crisis in a scenario where formal wages
were fully ﬂexible. We ﬁnd that in this case the crisis would have resulted
in a much smaller decline in formal employment between 2008 and 2013
(1.5–4.5% rather than the actual 16%).
To verify the validity of our empirical strategy, we perform a number of
checks. First, we run several placebo tests that provide support to the
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Figure 1. Wages in Formal and Informal Labor Markets in Lombardy. Logarithm of wages
(relative to formal sector in 2008) controlling for gender, age, education, country of origin,
family characteristics, occupation dummies, provinces of residence dummies. Thick line:
formal sector. Thin line: informal sector. Dashed lines: 95% conﬁdence interval.
Source: ISMU survey, authors’ calculations.
less relevant than the minimum wage regulation. However, these results may also be ex-
plained by the destruction of jobs due to the exit of ﬁrms that can neither reduce wages nor
reduce employment. Since our dataset does not include detailed data on employers, we
cannot distinguish between these two explanations.
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parallel trends assumption required for difference-in-differences estima-
tion. Second, we use the information we have on the immigrants’ inten-
tions to return to their origin country and show that informality is not
associated with selection into return migration. Third, the use of panel
data from alternative sources suggests that, in our setting, wage dynamics
are not driven by composition effects. Fourth, we graphically show that
key average observable characteristics—such as age, gender, and educa-
tion—do not change in a relevant way after the crisis starts, which bolsters
our conﬁdence that the recession did not change the composition of the
immigrants. Fifth, we conﬁrm the results of the previous two checks rely-
ing on a test in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005). Sixth, since the recession
may in principle induce workers to move to lower paying occupations, we
show that our results are remarkably similar when we run our speciﬁca-
tions with or without occupation dummies. Finally, in addition to provide
support to the empirical strategy, these checks are also consistent with our
calibration exercise, showing small spillovers between informal and
formal labor markets in our setting during the recession.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. We start with a brief
overview of the relevant literature in Section 2. We then present the back-
ground information on the Italian labor market institutions in Section 3.
In Section 4 we discuss our empirical methodology. The data are intro-
duced in Section 5. Section 6 presents the econometric results, robustness
checks, and placebo tests. Section 7 analyzes the impact of the crisis on the
formal and informal employment and the spillover effects between formal
and informal labor markets. Section 8 concludes, adds caveats on the
external validity of our ﬁndings, lists the robustness checks that provide
support to our empirical strategy, and brieﬂy discusses the contribution of
this work to the immigration literature.
2. Literature Review
Our article contributes to several strands of research. First, we bring new
evidence on the evolution of labor market outcomes of immigrants
through the business cycle. Dustmann et al. (2010) analyze differences
in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants and na-
tives in Germany and the UK. They ﬁnd signiﬁcantly larger unemploy-
ment responses to economic shocks for immigrants relative to natives
within the same skill group. Their estimates instead show little evidence
for differential wage responses to economic shocks. Orrenius and
Zavodny (2010) compare the impact of the Great Recession on
Mexican-born immigrants and native US workers with similar character-
istics. They ﬁnd that immigrants’ employment and unemployment rates
are particularly affected by the recession; the impact is especially strong
for low-skilled and illegal immigrants. The authors also argue that one of
the major channels of adjustment is a great reduction of the inﬂow of
Mexican immigrants during the recession. Lessem and Nakajima (2015)
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conﬁrm this ﬁnding using the data from the Mexican Migration Project
based on the undocumented migrants’ recollections of their dates of trips
to the United States and the wages they earned there. They also show that
undocumented Mexican immigrants’ wages in the United States are nega-
tively correlated with the US unemployment rate—unlike the wages of the
legal migrants and the wages of the natives, including those of theMexican
origin. Their estimates stress the important role of occupational spillovers:
during the US recessions, undocumented Mexican immigrants are more
likely to shift to agricultural jobs. Our work adds to this ﬁrst branch of
literature by exploiting information from a unique dataset on immigrants
working in the formal and informal labor markets, considering informal
employment as a proxy for unregulated counterfactual to the regulated
formal labor market. We also quantify the spillovers from formal to in-
formal labor markets during periods of economic downturn.4
Second, we contribute to the literature on market outcomes of docu-
mented and undocumented immigrants. There are works showing how
undocumented immigrants have on average worse labor market outcomes
than documented immigrants (see, e.g., Borjas and Tienda (1993);
Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002); Kaushal (2006); Amuedo-Dorantes
et al. (2007); Fasani (2015); Monras et al. (2018)). This effect of legal
status on labor market outcomes may be related to the restricted set of
job opportunities for undocumented immigrants or their bargaining
power relative to employers, which is lower than the one of immigrants
with a regular residence permit. These differential effects related to the
labor market may affect other important outcomes, such as consumption
behavior (Dustmann et al. 2017a) and propensity to commit crimes
(Pinotti 2017). Our study shows important implications of labor market
regulation for the economic integration of immigrants. During periods of
crisis, labor market regulation can reduce the attractiveness of regulariza-
tion programs, that is fewer undocumented immigrants would apply for
getting legal status in the host country. Similarly, more regulated labor
markets in destination countries can lower the expected value for potential
migrants in source countries to choose the legal emigration option rather
than emigration without a visa. A novelty of our analysis is to suggest that
links between labor market regulation and effectiveness of immigration
policies—among others those that affect immigrants’ legal status—may
have important consequences for immigrants’ economic outcomes.
Third, there is additional literature studying immigration during peri-
ods of economic downturn. Using data on 15Western European countries
before and during the Great Recession, D’Amuri and Peri (2014) ﬁnd that
an inﬂow of immigrants generates a reallocation of natives to occupations
4. For the literature that analyzes informal labormarkets in LatinAmerican countries, see
Bosch and Maloney (2010), Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2015), Almeida and Carneiro (2012),
and Meghir et al. (2015).
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with a stronger content of complex abilities.5 This reallocation is more
salient in countries with low employment protection and for workers with
low education levels. Their estimates also show that this process remained
signiﬁcant—even if it slowed down—during the ﬁrst years of the Great
Recession.
Another strand of literature analyzes the role of migration as a channel
of adjustment during crisis. The seminal contribution by Blanchard et al.
(1992) studies the response of the US economy to regional shocks and
points at interstate labor mobility as the major channel of adjustment in
the long run. For instance, after several years local economies adjust to
aggregate demand shocks in terms of labor force participation and un-
employment rates, while the workers who cannot ﬁnd jobs in the de-
pressed states move out to other states. Decressin and Fatas (1995)
carry out a similar analysis for European regions. They ﬁnd that the
European workers are less mobile than their American counterparts,
and adjustment mainly occurs through reduced labor force participation.
Mauro and Spilimbergo (1999) consider the case of a single European
country, Spain, focusing on the heterogeneity of the adjustment mechan-
isms across skills groups. Their results suggest that high-skilled Spanish
workers respond with out-migration from the depressed provinces while
the low-skilled drop out of the labor force or remain unemployed.6 Beyer
and Smets (2015) suggest that declining interstate migration in the United
States since the 1980s and rising migration in Europe over the last 25 years
are gradually leading to a convergence of the adjustment processes in the
United States and Europe. Cadena and Kovak (2016) show that Mexican-
born immigrants help to equalize spatial differences across local US labor
markets. Interestingly, this takes place in both the high-skilled and low-
skilled segments of the labor market. Low-skilled immigrants turn out to
be very responsive to labor market shocks, which helps equilibrating local
labor markets even though low-skilled natives are not mobile. This litera-
ture shares with our work the focus on immigrants during recessions, but –
differently from these works – we analyze the evolution of immigrants’
labor market outcomes during periods of negative demand shocks.
Although the main focus of our work is adding new evidence on market
outcomes of documented versus undocumented immigrants and on the
evolution of labor market outcomes of immigrants through the business
cycle, our work is also related to several cross-country studies of labor
markets’ response to recessions: Nickell (1997) compares the labor
5. Examples of other works analyzing the labor market impact of immigration are Card
(1990), Borjas (2003), Cortes (2008), Farre´ et al. (2011), Glitz (2012),Manacorda et al. (2012),
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Dustmann et al. (2013), Facchini et al. (2013), Docquier et al.
(2014), Dustmann et al. (2017b), and Foged and Peri (2016).
6. The analysis of the heterogeneity of the workforce and therefore of the labor market
adjustments has greatly beneﬁted from the development of measures of skill content of oc-
cupations by Autor et al. (2003), Peri and Sparber (2009), Goos et al. (2009), and Goos et al.
(2014). We also adopt these measures to disaggregate the channels of adjustment in our data.
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markets of Europe and North America; Card et al. (1999) analyze changes
in wages and employment rates due to adverse demand shocks in the
United States, Canada, and France; Botero et al. (2004) code the regula-
tion of labor markets in 85 countries; Bentolila et al. (2012) compare labor
markets institutions and unemployment rates during the Great Recession
in France and Spain; Elsby et al. (2016) study wage adjustment during
recessions in the United States and Great Britain. Hoffmann and Lemieux
(2016) compare unemployment rates during the Great Recession in
Canada, Germany and the United States. Another approach taken by
the literature is comparing labor markets in different industries within
the same country. For instance, Besley and Burgess (2004) present evi-
dence on the effects of labor regulation on economic performance across
Indian states, comparing agriculture and nonagricultural occupations, as
well as registered and unregistered sectors. Pischke (2016) analyzes how
the housing cycle affects wage and employment responses of three occu-
pations in the housing market: real estate agents, architects, and construc-
tion workers. Fouge`re et al. (2016) study the effect of minimum wage on
wage bargaining, using data from 350 industries in France. Our contribu-
tion to this literature is that we study regulated and unregulated labor
markets within the same occupation within the same country, thus ad-
dressing major cross-country and cross-industry comparability concerns.
In addition, our article brings new evidence on the recent literature on
dual labor markets in Europe. The peculiarity of the dual labor market in
Europe is discussed in detail by Boeri (2011), who provides a comprehen-
sive survey of the literature on the impact of recent labor market reforms
in Europe. Bentolila et al. (2012) compare labor market institutions in
France and Spain to explain the strikingly different evolution of un-
employment during the Great Recession in the two countries. In fact un-
employment rate was around 8% in both France and Spain just before the
Great Recession, but by 2011 it increased to 10% in France and 23% in
Spain. The authors explain the differential with the larger gap between
ﬁring costs in permanent and temporary contracts, and the laxer rules on
the use of the latter in Spain. Our article also considers dual labor markets,
although we study the duality of formal/regulated versus informal/un-
regulated markets rather than the duality between permanent and tem-
porary contracts. We also complement this literature by suggesting an
identiﬁcation strategy that is less subject to comparability concerns,
which are common to cross-country studies of labor markets.
3. Background Information on the Italian Labor Market
The Italian formal labor market has centralized collective bargaining in-
stitutions. After the abolishment of the automatic indexation of wages to
past inﬂation (the so-called scala mobile) in 1992, Italy created a two-tier
bargaining structure where wages are determined via both plant-level and
industry-level/centralized negotiations. In particular, nation-wide sectoral
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collective agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions
(Contratto Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro, CCNL) specify job titles in each
industry and decide speciﬁc minimum wages that apply to each job title,
regardless of a worker’s union membership. Firms cannot deviate from
the sector-wide agreements through “opting-out” clauses, but in principle,
on top of the industry-minimum wage, they can add a wage premium
related to performance. However, as Boeri (2014) documents, the percent-
age of ﬁrms relying on the two-tier bargaining – both plant-level and
industry-level – decreased over time, down to less than 10% in 2006: em-
ployers in Italy typically prefer following the wages set by industry agree-
ments, rather than through further negotiations at the plant level.
Devicienti et al. (2016) discuss available evidence suggesting that this de-
cline over time in the incidence of ﬁrm-level agreements in Italy was partly
a consequence of a reduction in unionization rates.
Italy’s formal labor market is also characterized by relatively high levels
of employment protection, and relatively low levels of both unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and active labor market policies (such as training programs,
job search assistance, counseling, etc.). According to the 2013 OECD in-
dicators of employment protection, Italy ranks 30 out of the 34 OECD
members in terms of protection of permanent workers against individual
and collective dismissals, and 27 out of 34 in terms of regulation of tem-
porary employment.7 These features make the Italian context different for
instance from the ﬂexicurity of Scandinavian countries. However, over the
last decades, and similarly to other European countries, several reforms
aimed at introducing various types of temporary contracts and increasing
labor market ﬂexibility.8
Italy has a large informal labor market. In the period considered in our
study—from 2001 to 2013—both left- and right-wing governments
adopted several pieces of legislation to reduce informality. Nonetheless,
these policies have not been particularly effective in tackling the issue of
informal employment. In fact, according to recent estimates the Italian
underground economy accounts for about 25% of the GDP (Orsi et al.
2014). As Capasso and Jappelli (2013) describe, industries differ in terms
of level of informality: measures of job informality are as high as 31% in
the construction sector and 25% in the retail and tourism sectors and as
7. These indicators rank OECD members from countries with least restrictions to those
with most restrictions.
8. Examples of these reforms are the law no. 196/1997 (“Treu law”), decree law no. 368/
2001, law no. 30/2003 (“Biagi law”), and law 78/2014 (“Poletti decree”). See Ichino and
Riphahn (2005), Kugler and Pica (2008), Cappellari et al. (2012), Leonardi and Pica
(2013), Cingano et al. (2016), and Daruich et al. (2017) for works on the effects of changes
in employment protection legislation. For empirical evidence on the consequences of tem-
porary work employment on subsequent labor market outcomes, see Booth et al. (2002),
Ichino et al. (2008), and Autor and Houseman (2010). For works on the impact of labor
market institutions on employment, see also Card and Krueger (1994), Dube et al. (2010),
Allegretto et al. (2011), Neumark et al. (2014), and Neumark (2014).
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low as 12% and 15% in ﬁnance and manufacturing, respectively. Capasso
and Jappelli (2013) also document that informal labor markets are par-
ticularly well-developed in sectors with relatively low levels of competition
and small ﬁrm sizes.
The large size of the informal labor market implies that immigrants who
reside in Italy without a regular residence permit (we will refer to these as
“undocumented” or “illegal” immigrants) have a relatively high probabil-
ity of ﬁnding a job. Given that they are not entitled to work in the formal
sector, illegal immigrants might prefer to locate in countries like Italy with
a large shadow economy. In terms of labor market outcomes, both docu-
mented and undocumented immigrants lag behind natives with similar
levels of education. For instance, Accetturo and Infante (2010) show
that returns to schooling for immigrants are much lower than the ones
for native Italians. Moreover, immigrants residing in Italy are likely to
work in occupations that are not appropriate to their level of education.
As the OECD (2008) report suggests, one of the reasons why immigrants’
over-qualiﬁcation occurs lies in the fact that Italy is a relatively new im-
migration country. Given that an appropriate match between jobs and
immigrants’ qualiﬁcations takes time—because for instance immigrants
do not have well-developed professional networks in the host country or
they lack complementary skills such as the knowledge of the host country
language—upon arrival immigrant workers are likely to accept unskilled
jobs with the hope of upward professional mobility as their stay in Italy
continues.
4. Methodology
We use the difference-in-differences methodology to analyze the evolution
of wages in the formal and informal labor markets before and during the
crisis. Our benchmark speciﬁcation is the following:
Wiocpt ¼ Informali+ Crisist Informali+Xi+o+c+p+t+eiocpt; ð1Þ
where W is the logarithm of the after-tax monthly wage of a full-time
employed worker i from country of origin c working in occupation o
and residing in province p at the time of the interview t (t ¼ 2001; . . .;
2013).9 Control variables Xi include gender, age, age squared, years
in Italy, education, dummy for being married, children abroad, and chil-
dren in Italy. We include dummy variables o, c, p, and t for occupa-
tions, countries of origin, provinces of residence, and year ﬁxed effects,
respectively. We cluster the standard errors by province of residence, by
simple/complex dummy and by before/after crisis dummy; we end up
9. Conditioning on full-time employment, the estimated coefﬁcient at the interaction term
does not include the differential effect of informality during the crisis through changes in
working hours. In Table A7 (Supplementary Appendix) we show regressions where we use
information on individuals who are employed on part-time basis. The ISMUdataset does not
include information on hourly wages or the number of hours worked.
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with 44 clusters (11 provinces times 2 types of occupations times 2 time
periods).10
A potential threat to the identiﬁcation might arise if the formal and
informal sectors have been distinctively hit by the Great Recession due to
preexisting differences in industry specialization. Our benchmark speciﬁ-
cation, however, partially takes this into account by controlling for occu-
pation ﬁxed effects. In fact, the deﬁnition of “occupation” provided by the
ISMU survey differs from the standard international classiﬁcations of
occupations, such as the ISCO or SOC codings. For instance, 17 occupa-
tions can be tracked over time (see Table A3 in Supplementary Appendix):
unskilled workers, skilled workers, building workers, farm workers, clea-
ners, warehouse and custody workers, clerical workers, sales workers,
food and beverage workers, craftsmen, truck workers, house helpers,
home-based caregivers, baby sitters, social assistance operators, medical
and paramedical, intellectual professions. The ISMU classiﬁcation is
therefore a mix between occupations and industries, and as such control-
ling for it takes into account both dimensions. This is particularly import-
ant given that the Great Recession may have affected asymmetrically
tradable and nontradable sectors. As a further robustness test, column 1
of Table A11 in Supplementary Appendix shows that results are robust to
the inclusion of interaction variables between the crisis dummy and
occupations.
Our main variables of interest are Informali (dummy for employment in
the informal sector) and Crisist Informali—the interaction term of
Informali and Crisist. The latter is a dummy for years after 2009:
Crisist ¼ 1ðt  2009Þ.11 As the informal labor market is unregulated, we
should expect  < 0—during the crisis wages in the informal sector should
adjust downward to a greater extent than wages in the regulated formal
sector.
Following Donald and Lang (2007), we carry out a two-stage procedure
as well, where in the ﬁrst stage we regress wages on individual character-
istics (gender, age, age squared, education, family status, children in Italy,
children in the home country, years in Italy, dummies for country of
origin, and province of residence) controlling for precrisis occupation-
10. It is not clear whether 44 should be considered a small number of clusters, thereby
resulting in biased estimates. For instance, the seminal papers by Bertrand et al. (2004) and
Cameron et al. (2008) show that clustered standard errors perform quite well with as low as 20
and 30 clusters, respectively. Nevertheless, we also perform a wild-bootstrap procedure,
which has good size properties with small numbers of clusters. In line with the recommen-
dations of Cameron et al. (2008), Rademacher weights (+1 with probability 0.5 and 1 with
probability 0.5) are used when resampling residuals, and the null hypothesis of zero treatment
effect is imposed. Estimates (available upon request) suggest robustness of our ﬁndings.
11. In Section 6.1, we show that the crisis signiﬁcantly affected labor market outcomes
from 2009 onwards. However, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results, but smaller magnitudes,
when we consider an alternative proxy for Crisis using Crisist ¼ 1ðt  2008Þ (i.e., assuming
that the crisis started a year before). In our robustness checks, we also use a province-level
unemployment rate as a continuous measure of recession.
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speciﬁc linear trends. In the second stage, instead, we regress the residuals
on informal sector dummy and Crisist Informali interaction term (con-
trolling for year dummies, occupation dummies, province dummies).
In order to understand what drives the wage adjustment or the lack
thereof, we also investigate the heterogeneity of treatment effects. First,
we distinguish workers for whom the minimum wage is likely to be bind-
ing and those whose wages are safely above the minimum wage. We deﬁne
as “just above the minimum wage” those earnings up to 17% greater than
the national minimum wage for that speciﬁc occupation—17% being the
reduction that informal earnings experienced due to the crisis.12 We then
estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences speciﬁcation similar to
equation (1), including three additional interaction terms: the interaction
of earnings safely above the minimum wage with crisis dummy, the inter-
action of earnings safely above the minimum wage with informal employ-
ment dummy, and the triple interaction. The coefﬁcient of interest in these
speciﬁcations is the one at the triple interaction term: if the minimum wage
prevents downward adjustment of wages in the formal sector, we should
ﬁnd a positive sign, that is a stronger effect of the crisis on the wage
differential between formal and informal employment for those occupa-
tions where wages before the crisis were not too far from the minimum
wages.
We also distinguish “simple” and “complex” occupations. Since simple
occupations involve generic skills, there is a greater extent of substitut-
ability between workers (including immigrant and native workers) within
such occupations—as well as across such occupations. Therefore in the
absence of regulation, such occupations should undergo a more substan-
tial downward wage adjustment during recession. On the other hand, in
complex occupations, skills are more speciﬁc and workers are less substi-
tutable. In these complex occupations, even unregulated labor markets
may not see large drops in wages in times of recession and high unemploy-
ment. To check this, we add three interaction terms to the speciﬁcation (1):
the triple interaction term Crisist Informali Simple occupationso and two
double interaction terms Crisist Simple occupationso; and Informali
Simple occupationso. In this difference-in-difference-in-differences speci-
ﬁcation, the coefﬁcient at Crisist Informali allows quantifying the effect of
the recession on the wage differential between formal (regulated) and in-
formal (unregulated) employment for complex occupations. We expect to
ﬁnd a stronger effect for simple rather than complex occupations, that is a
negative sign of the coefﬁcient at the triple interaction term Crisist
Informali Simple occupationso. We adopt the same approach to check
whether the effects vary across occupations with different degree of infor-
mality. Finally, we study heterogeneity of effects by education, age, and
gender.
12. As a robustness check, we tried other thresholds for the deﬁnition of bindingminimum
wages, such as 10%, 20%, and 30%. The results (available upon request) are similar.
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Figure 1 and placebo regressions conﬁrm the validity of the parallel
trends assumption required for a difference-in-differences estimation.
Still it is worth noting that our estimates would be biased if unobservable
characteristics of formal and informal workers changed during the crisis,
thereby affecting the composition of the sample. For instance, workers’
risk aversion might be somehow impacted by negative demand shocks
such as the Great Recession, so that more risk-averse individuals may
prefer employment in the formal labor market during crisis. To check
whether our ﬁndings are due to changes in unobservables over time, we
test if the coefﬁcient of interest at the interaction term Crisist Informali
remains stable once including control variables sequentially. Indeed, indi-
vidual characteristics such as gender, age, and education have been shown
to be important correlates of the level of risk aversion (see Guiso and
Paiella (2008) and Borghans et al. (2009) among others). In addition, fol-
lowing Altonji et al. (2005), we report a test assessing the severity of the
time-varying selection on unobservables. This analysis shows that changes
in risk aversion or other unobservables of similar nature during the Great
Recession are not signiﬁcant drivers of our ﬁndings.
We also exploit panel data information from alternative sources
to verify that the wage dynamics of Figure 1 are not due to low abil-
ity people switching from the formal to the informal labor market
during crisis. Our check shows that this potential composition effect
does not play a relevant role in our context. Finally, we calibrate a
simple model to quantify the spillovers between regular and irregular
labor markets.
5. Data
Our main database comes from the annual survey of immigrants under-
taken by an independent Italian nonproﬁt organization called Foundation
for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-Ethnicity (ISMU). This survey pro-
vides a large and representative sample of both documented and undocu-
mented immigrants residing in Lombardy and working in formal and
informal sectors.13 The ISMU survey adopts an intercept point sampling
methodology, where the ﬁrst step involves listing a series of locations
typically frequented by immigrants (such as religious sites, ethnic shops,
or healthcare facilities), whereas in a second step both meeting points and
migrants to interview are randomly selected. At each interview, migrants
are asked how often they visit the other meeting points, which permits to
compute ex-post selection probabilities into the sample. This approach
allows the ISMU survey to produce a representative sample of the total
13. In other datasets containing information on natives’ labor market outcomes—such as
the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy or the Labor
Force Survey by ISTAT—the informality status is either conﬁdential or not available.
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immigrant population residing in Lombardy.14 The latter is the richest
region in Italy, after the self-governing province of Bolzano. Eurostat
statistics show that in 2015 Lombardy’s real GDP per capita was com-
parable to the one of Denmark.
As Dustmann et al. (2017a) point out, to elicit truthful reporting of
characteristics such as undocumented status and informal employment,
the ISMU questionnaire does not ask for any sensitive information, such
as the home addresses and the names, and the data are collected in public
spaces by foreign-born interviewers who emphasize the independence of
ISMU from the Italian government. Intercepting immigrants in public
places allows to survey individuals who would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd in
their homes.
Table A1 in the Supplementary Appendix presents descriptive statistics
on immigrants working in the formal sector (regular workers) and the
informal sector (irregular workers) as well as on legal (documented) and
illegal (undocumented) immigrants.15 The vast majority of our sample is
formed by migrants with valid residence permit and work contract (82%).
In contrast, around 8% of the sample consists of illegal migrants in infor-
mal employment. The remaining individuals are equally shared between
legal migrants working in the informal sector (5%) and undocumented
migrants working in regular employment. Overall, the informal sector
accounts for around 13% of the overall (documented and undocumented)
foreign-born workforce. Table A1 in Supplementary Appendix shows that
94% of the documented immigrants work in the formal labor market. The
descriptive statistics in the same table also point out that 38% of the
undocumented immigrants report to work with a regular job contract.
This large percentage is partly due to our deﬁnition of undocumented
immigrants, which also includes those whose residence permit has expired,
but they are renewing it at the time of the interview. If we classify these
immigrants as documented, then rather than 38%, about 13% of the un-
documented immigrants report to work with a formal employment con-
tract.16 The latter percentage is consistent with the descriptive statistics of
14. See Fasani (2015) and Dustmann et al. (2017a) for a more detailed description of these
data. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015) also use data from the ISMU survey. McKenzie and
Mistiaen (2009) compare intercept point surveys with census-based and snowball surveys.
15. Throughout the article, we refer to those employed in the formal sector as “regular
workers” and those employed in the informal sector as “irregular workers.” Similarly, we use
“illegal” and “undocumented” interchangeably to denote immigrants residing in Italy with-
out a regular residence permit.
16. Migration policies in Italy do not allow foreigners without valid residence permit to
have a formal work contract. The fact that 5% of our sample work in the formal sector but
reside illegally in Italy is mostly due to three factors. First, as Fasani (2015) argues, some of
the ISMU respondents may confound stable employment with having a valid employment
contract. Second, migrants may use ﬁctitious documents in order to stipulate a formal work
contract. Third, among the undocumented immigrants there are as well those individuals
whose residence permit expired, but who signed a regular labor contract before expiration of
the residence permit.In order to ensure that our results are not biased by these measurement
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Fasani (2015), who uses the same dataset and shows 15% for a similar
statistic considering a shorter time period (from 2001 to 2007).
In our main regressions, we focus on full-time workers to abstract from
changes in hours worked (although we show robustness of our ﬁndings to
the inclusion of part-time employment as well). We consider the following
categories of workers: full-time permanent and ﬁxed-term regular work-
ers, irregular workers in stable employment, regular self-employment, and
irregular self-employment. Conversely, part-time employment includes
regular part-time workers and irregular workers in unstable employment.
According to this deﬁnition, there are about 4000 full-time-employed re-
spondents in each year. Respondents also provide information about their
occupation, country of origin, year of arrival to Italy, monthly earnings,
family status, etc. Summary statistics are in Table A2 in the
Supplementary Appendix. Table A3 in the Supplementary Appendix pre-
sents the breakdown of the sample by occupations, as well as regular and
irregular employment for each occupation. The table also includes average
wages in the formal and informal sector and the minimum wage for each
occupation.17
There is no national minimum wage in Italy (even though Article 36 of
the Constitution states that salaries must be high enough to provide a
decent subsistence for the worker and his family). Instead, minimum
wages are set through collective bargaining agreements between em-
ployers associations and trade unions. In particular, national collective
issues linked to eliciting illegal/irregular situations in surveys, we perform two robustness
checks. First, we replicate our main results restricting the estimation sample to documented
immigrants only. Tables A13, A14, A15, and A16 in Supplementary Appendix —as well as a
replication of the benchmark estimations of Table 1 available upon request—all show that
results are robust to this check. Second, we replicate our main results (Table 1) considering
all undocumented migrants as working in the informal sector (tables available upon request).
This does not affect our main results (the wage differential between formal and informal
sector signiﬁcantly rises during the crisis) as well.
17. The ISMU dataset contains information on immigrants only. In order to compare the
labor market dynamics during the recession for the whole Italian workforce with those for the
immigrant population, we exploit data from the Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) by the Bank of Italy. This survey is administered every two years and provides
information on a representative sample of natives and foreign born workforce, even if for
conﬁdentiality issues the variable on nationality is not publicly available. SHIW includes
information on wages along several individual characteristics, although it does not include
the informality variable which is key to our analysis. Cappariello and Zizza (2010) use infor-
mation on payment of pension contributions to build a proxy of irregular labor market status
throughout the entire career. However, this information does not allow to characterize the
current informality status or to link the informality status to business cycle conditions. We
restrict the sample to Lombardy only and to the period 2000–12, so that descriptives are
comparable with the ISMU data. Table A4 in the Supplementary Appendix shows that
average monthly net wages by occupation in the SHIW survey are directly comparable to
those of immigrants from the ISMU (see last column of Table A3 in Supplementary
Appendix). Moreover, Figure A1 in Supplementary Appendix suggests that, after controlling
for observables, wages in ISMU and in SHIW moved in parallel in 2000–12, and their dif-
ference was statistically different from zero until 2004.
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contracts impose minimum salaries for employees at different skill levels
in numerous economic activities, covering both unionized and non-
unionized workers. We collect and reconstruct minimum wages from
over 140 nationwide collective contracts in effect in 2007, just before the
start of the crisis. We then aggregate minimum wages in order to match
the professions included in the ISMU dataset (see Table A3 in
Supplementary Appendix).18
In order to time the beginning of the recession, we use ofﬁcial macro-
economic data on Lombardy and its 11 provinces.19 Figure 2 plots quar-
terly data on unemployment rate in Lombardy at regional level for the
period considered in the regression analysis (2001–13). The increase in
unemployment in Lombardy started in the beginning of 2009 and contin-
ued until the end of 2013. Figure 3 presents the evolution of unemploy-
ment rates in Lombardy’s provinces (this information is available only
since 2004). Although there is substantial heterogeneity in levels and dy-
namics of unemployment, most Lombardian provinces have experienced
sharp increase in unemployment since 2009.
To differentiate between simple and complex occupations, we follow
Peri and Sparber (2009) and D’Amuri and Peri (2014) and exploit the US
Department of Labor’s O*NET abilities survey to gain information on the
abilities required by each occupation. This database estimates the import-
ance of 52 skills required in each profession. We merge information from
the ISMU survey with the O*NET values and select 23O*NET variables
which are supposed to provide an adequate representation of simple/com-
plex jobs (Peri and Sparber (2009) carry out a similar procedure). In par-
ticular, we distinguish between two types of skills: manual (or physical)
skills represent limb, hand and ﬁnger dexterity, as well as body coordin-
ation, ﬂexibility and strength; conversely, communication (or language)
skills include oral and written comprehension and expression. Once the 23
variables have been selected (see the Table A5 in the Supplementary
Appendix), we normalize them to [0, 1] scale. Importantly, we invert the
scale for the four communication skills (oral comprehension, written com-
prehension, oral expression, written expression) and then calculate the
average of the 23 variables. The resulting index ranks professions in
order of complexity where a profession with a high communication skill
intensity is considered as “complex”while high levels of manual skill in-
tensity refer to “simple” jobs. Finally, we compute the median value for
the index and distinguish between simple (above the median) and complex
(below the median) occupations.
18. Examples of other works that use information from collective bargaining agreements
(Contratto Collettivo Nazionale di Lavoro, CCNL) are Cappellari et al. (2012), Card et al.
(2013), and Daruich et al. (2017).
19. The province of Monza e della Brianza was ofﬁcially created by splitting the north-
eastern part from the province of Milan on May 12, 2004, and became fully functional after
the provincial elections of June 7, 2009. For consistency with pre-2009 data, we consider the
newly-created province of Monza e della Brianza as part of Milan province.
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6. Results
6.1 Placebo Tests
The identifying assumption of our difference-in-differences speciﬁcation is
that wages of workers in the formal and informal sectors would have
followed the same time trend in the absence of the Great Recession. If
this parallel trends assumption holds, our empirical strategy allows to
control for all unobserved differences between formal and informal work-
ers that remain constant over time.
Figure 1 has already provided visual support to the main identifying
hypothesis, showing that wages moved in parallel in formal and informal
sectors before the recession. For further veriﬁcation of the common trends
assumption, we run several placebo tests. The rationale behind these
checks is to use only data before the recession and create a placebo
Figure 3. Unemployment by Province within Lombardy.
Source: ISTAT.
Figure 2. Unemployment Rate in Lombardy by Quarters (2001–13).
Source: ISTAT.
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treatment that precedes the crisis. This exercise also allows to provide
additional conﬁrmation on the timing of the beginning of the crisis in
Lombardy—2009 rather than 2008—a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
evolution of unemployment over time in Figure 2.
In the ﬁrst three columns of Table A6 in Supplementary Appendix we
use data from 2001 to 2007. The placebo treatment variable Placebo is
equal to 1 for the year 2004 in column 1, for the year 2007 in column 2 and
for the years 2006 and 2007 in column 3. In the last three columns of Table
A6 in Supplementary Appendix we use data from 2001 to 2008. The
Placebo variable is equal to 1 for the year 2008 in column 4, for the
years 2007 and 2008 in column 5, and for the years 2006, 2007, and
2008 in column 6. Indeed, throughout all speciﬁcations, the interaction
term between the Informal dummy and the Placebo variable is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant, implying the validity of our difference-in-differences
strategy. Importantly, the estimation results in Table A6
(Supplementary Appendix) also show the absence of an “Ashenfelter’s
dip” (see Ashenfelter (1978)): the wage differential does not change just
prior to the crisis.
6.2 Main Results
Our main results are presented in Table 1. The ﬁrst column reports the
estimation of speciﬁcation (1), considering 2009 as the beginning of the
crisis. Results are in line with our hypotheses: the wage differential be-
tween formal and informal sector is 15% before 2009, whereas it raises by
12 percentage points to 27% during the crisis (the difference is statistically
signiﬁcant).
In order to measure the wage differential between formal and informal
sectors in every year, in the second column we include interaction terms of
the dummy for the informal sector with year dummies. The coefﬁcients of
these interaction terms are not signiﬁcant before the crisis but become
signiﬁcant after the crisis. The wage differential increases by 6 percentage
points in 2009 relative to 2008 (however the increase is not statistically
signiﬁcant); the wage differential grows to 11 percentage points in 2010,
then to 14 percentage points in 2011, to 15 percentage points in 2012, and
to 17 percentage points in 2013 (all statistically signiﬁcant).
In the third column, we approximate the wage differential with piece-
wise-linear function of time allowing for a discontinuous shift at 2009 and
a change in the slope afterwards. Once again, we ﬁnd that in 2009 the wage
differential between formal and informal sectors increases by 6 percentage
points and then rises by 2.5 percentage points every year. In the last
column of Table 1 we assume that the crisis started in 2008 rather than
in 2009. Results are qualitatively similar, but the magnitude of the coef-
ﬁcient of interest is smaller: a 9-percentage point increase in the wage
differential between formal and informal workers during the crisis,
which is smaller than the 12-percentage point increase in the benchmark
speciﬁcation.
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Table 1. Wage Differential Between Formal (Regulated) and Informal (Unregulated)
Sector: Difference-in-Differences Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 2009 Crisis 2009 Crisis 2009 Crisis 2008
Informal X Crisis 0.119*** 0.059* 0.089***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.022)
Informal 0.145*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.144***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017)
Informal X Year2001 0.008
(0.029)
Informal X Year2002 0.037
(0.041)
Informal X Year2003 0.003
(0.032)
Informal X Year2004 0.016
(0.031)
Informal X Year2005 0.007
(0.020)
Informal X Year2006 0.013
(0.025)
Informal X Year2007 0.020
(0.032)
Informal X Year2009 0.059
(0.036)
Informal X Year2010 0.109***
(0.036)
Informal X Year2011 0.137**
(0.066)
Informal X Year2012 0.150***
(0.036)
Informal X Year2013 0.171***
(0.044)
Informal X maxfYear 2009; 0g 0.025***
(0.007)
Female 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.167***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 1.659*** 1.649*** 1.601*** 1.658***
(0.330) (0.329) (0.321) (0.334)
Age squared 1.936*** 1.923*** 1.843*** 1.938***
(0.373) (0.370) (0.358) (0.377)
Years in Italy 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Compulsory school 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
High school 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Tertiary education 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.071*** 0.073***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married 0.017** 0.017** 0.015* 0.016**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Children abroad 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(continued)
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Controls are statistically signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcients have the ex-
pected sign. Other things being equal, women earn 17% less than men.
The effect of age is nonlinear: an additional year increases earnings by 1%
at the age of 18 years but has negative effect after the age of 43 years; at the
age of 55 years, an additional year of age decreases earnings by about
0.5%. Each year spent in Italy raises wages by 1.1%. Completion of com-
pulsory school increases wages by 2.2% (relative to no schooling), higher
education—by another 5%. Such low returns to education are not surpris-
ing given that most immigrants are employed in low-skilled and middle-
skilled jobs. Married workers earn wages that are 2% higher than those of
other workers.
Table 2 reports the results of our two-stage procedure described in
Section 4 where we ﬁrst estimate a Mincerian equation for wages and
then run the residuals from the Mincerian equation on Crisist Informali
interaction term. We run regressions separately with and without sample
weights. We also check whether the results are similar if we group the data
into occupation-province cells (for each year and for formal and informal
sector separately) or whether we use individual data (in the latter case we
cluster standard errors by province, occupation, year, and informal sector
dummy). The results are similar. Before the crisis, the wage differential
between formal and informal sector is 14–21%; after the crisis it increases
by additional 12–15 percentage points.
6.3 Heterogeneity of Treatment
As discussed in Section 4, in order to analyze the role of the minimum
wage regulations, we estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences spe-
ciﬁcation similar to equation (1), but where we allow for a differential
effect for workers whose earnings are close to the occupation-speciﬁc min-
imum wage and workers whose earnings are substantially higher than the
minimum wage. Estimates in column 3 of Panel A of Table 3 show that the
minimum wage is an important driver of our results. This ﬁnding is
Table 1. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis 2009 Crisis 2009 Crisis 2009 Crisis 2008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Children in Italy 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 49, 193 49, 193 49, 193 49, 193
R2 0.333 0.333 0.342 0.332
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province times simple occupations dummy times before/
after crisis dummy. All regressions include year dummies, occupation dummies, dummies for country of origin,
province dummies.
*p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01. Data are from the ISMU survey (2001–13). We restrict the sample to immigrants
residing in Italy for at most 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the
logarithm of after-tax wage.
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conﬁrmed by the ﬁrst two columns of Panel A where we estimate our
baseline speciﬁcation for the subsample of migrants with earnings safely
above the minimum wage, and for the subsample with lower earnings; the
coefﬁcient at the Crisis*Informal interaction term is signiﬁcant only for
this latter subsample.
We also assess whether there exists a differential impact for individuals
working in occupation highly prone to informality. Speciﬁcally, we rank
occupations by the share of informal workers and distinguish occupations
between those below and above the median share.20 Results in columns 4–
6 of Panel A are strikingly homogeneous, with a wage gap for informal
workers during the crisis of about 10–12%. These estimates rule out that
the differences in wage adjustment between the two labor markets are
simply due to differences in the size of the negative demand shock affect-
ing the two markets.
We then rank occupations according to complexity. As discussed in
Section 5, we refer to occupations with high intensity of communications
skills and low intensity of manual skills as “complex” and the others as
“simple.”21 We again run two checks: the regressions for subsamples of
simple and complex occupations (columns 1 and 2 of Panel B of Table 3)
Table 2. Wage Differential Between Formal (Regulated) and Informal (Unregulated)
Sector: Two-Stage Difference-in-Differences Estimation
Individual data Province-occupation cells
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis X Informal 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14***
(0.025) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042)
Informal 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.14***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Observations 60322 60322 1960 1960
R2 0.492 0.424 0.284 0.207
Notes: In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the relationship between the logarithm of after-tax wage and individual char-
acteristics (gender, age, age squared, education, family status, children in Italy, children in the home country, years
in Italy, pre-crisis linear trends, dummies for country of origin, occupation-speciﬁc pre-crisis time trends, province
dummies). In the second stage, we regress the residuals on informal sector dummy and Crisis X Informal interaction
term (controlling for year dummies, occupation dummies, province dummies). Robust standard errors in parenth-
eses. In the ﬁrst two columns, standard errors are clustered by province times occupation times year times informal
sector dummy.
*p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01. Data are from the ISMU survey (2001–13). We restrict the sample to immigrants
residing in Italy for at most 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only.
20. Another way to distinguish between jobs differently prone to informality would be to
separate the analysis for workers in small versus large-size ﬁrms, as companies with a larger
workforce aremore likely to be in the formal sector. However, ISMUdataset does not include
information on ﬁrm size.
21. “Simple” occupations include unskilled workers, building workers, farm workers,
cleaners, craftsmen, and truck workers.
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Table 3. Heterogeneity of the Impact of the Crisis on the Wage Differential Between
Formal (Regulated) and Informal (Unregulated) Sector: Difference-in-Differences
Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A
Crisis X Informal 0.001 0.081** 0.371*** 0.125*** 0.103*** 0.117***
(0.012) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039)
Informal 0.025*** 0.143*** 0.269*** 0.151*** 0.145*** 0.160***
(0.009) (0.019) (0.050) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018)
Crisis X Informal X 0.307***
X Above min.wage. (0.043)
Crisis X Above min.wage. 0.348***
(0.018)
Informal X Above min.wage. 0.514***
(0.044)
Crisis X Informal X 0.011
X Above med. informal (0.049)
Crisis X Above
med. informal
0.038**
(0.017)
Informal X Above med. informal 0.016
(0.021)
Sample Above
min.
wage
Below
min.
wage
Full
sample
Below
med.
informality
Above
med.
informality
Full
sample
Observations 7, 881 41, 312 52, 579 25, 713 23, 480 49, 193
R2 0.763 0.379 0.391 0.293 0.361 0.333
Panel B
Crisis X Informal 0.179*** 0.072 0.078** 0.128*** 0.111*** 0.118***
(0.039) (0.050) (0.035) (0.040) (0.033) (0.029)
Informal 0.092*** 0.179*** 0.170*** 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.164***
(0.008) (0.026) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016)
Crisis X informal
X Simple
0.095*
(0.050)
Crisis X Simple 0.013
(0.018)
Informal X Simple 0.054***
(0.021)
Crisis X informal X
Unskilled
0.024
(0.036)
Crisis X Unskilled 0.007
(0.009)
Informal X Unskilled 0.030
(0.020)
(continued)
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and difference-in-difference-in-differences speciﬁcation (column 3 of
Panel B). We ﬁnd that our main result is driven by simple occupations
(where the effect is both large and statistically signiﬁcant). In the sub-
sample of complex occupations (column 2 of Panel B) the coefﬁcient at
the Crisist*Informali interaction term is not statistically signiﬁcant. The
results from the difference-in-difference-in-differences speciﬁcation are
similar. A possible reason for the larger downward wage adjustment
during the recession in simple occupations is that they involve generic
skills, which may imply a higher degree of substitutability between work-
ers (including immigrant and native workers).
While the previous checks concern differences in labor market charac-
teristics, we have also analyzed heterogeneity of effects by individual char-
acteristics. In particular, three potentially important dimensions of
different labor market responses are education, gender, and age.
Distinguishing between unskilled and skilled workers (the latter having
attained secondary or higher education) suggests no differential impact of
Table 3. Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel C
Crisis X Informal 0.089* 0.139*** 0.157*** 0.120*** 0.111** 0.103***
(0.049) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.043) (0.032)
Informal 0.167*** 0.106*** 0.189*** 0.140*** 0.159*** 0.252***
(0.021) (0.014) (0.031) (0.019) (0.021) (0.038)
Crisis X Informal X Female 0.057
(0.044)
Crisis X Female 0.012
(0.015)
Informal X Female 0.026
(0.036)
Crisis X informal
X Young
0.021
(0.030)
Crisis X Young 0.013
(0.009)
Informal X Young 0.118***
(0.038)
Sample Female Male Full Young Old Full
sample sample
Observations 15,684 33,509 52,579 25,995 23,198 52,579
R2 0.254 0.300 0.327 0.320 0.331 0.329
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province times simple occupations dummy times before/
after crisis dummy in subsamples, by province times occupation in columns 3 and 6. All regressions include
individual characteristics (gender, age, age squared, years in Italy, education, marital status, number of children),
year dummies, occupation dummies, dummies for country of origin, province dummies.
*p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01. Data are from the ISMU survey (2001–13). We restrict the sample to immigrants
residing in Italy for at most 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the
logarithm of after-tax wage.
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the crisis on the wages of the workforce by skill level: the wage gap be-
tween the informal and formal sector is stable at around 11–13% during
the crisis (columns 4–6 of Panel B). On the other hand, there is literature
showing that most recessions—and the Great Recession represents no
exception—affected male workers disproportionately and the unemploy-
ment rate among 16 to 24 year old workers increased signiﬁcantly more
than aggregate unemployment (see Elsby et al. (2010)). However, our es-
timates in Table 3 show no signiﬁcant difference for women and men
(columns 1–3 of Panel C) nor between young and old workers, deﬁned
as those below/above the median age of the sample (columns 4–6 of Panel
C).
In Table A7 in the Supplementary Appendix, we check two other po-
tential dimensions of heterogeneity of effects.22 First, we distinguish be-
tween self-employed and wage workers (columns 1–3). The sample of self-
employed is small and the differential effect of the crisis on the earnings
gap between self-employed and wage workers is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Secondly, we look at part-time and full-time workers separately and
in a difference-in-difference-in-differences speciﬁcation (columns 4–6 re-
spectively). Again, the wage differential after the recession remains similar
to the benchmark results when we consider part-time or full-time workers
only (0.13 and 0.12 respectively). The coefﬁcient of the triple inter-
action term in the difference-in-difference-in-differences speciﬁcation is
not statistically different from zero.23
6.4 Time-varying Selection on Unobservables
Our difference-in-differences approach provides unbiased results as long
as unobserved omitted differences between formal and informal workers
remain constant over time. If this assumption holds, then—conditional on
all control variables in our speciﬁcations—our identiﬁcation strategy con-
trols for immigrants self-selecting into informal work depending on their
unobserved and observed characteristics, and therefore workers can be
considered exogenously assigned to the treatment group.24
22. We do not consider heterogeneity of the effects between temporary and permanent
workers, because there is no such distinction among the informal workers who cannot secure
a permanent position.
23. We have also estimated a speciﬁcation similar to the one in column 1 of Table 2, except
that we consider as dependent variable a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is employed
full-time and 0 if she is employed part-time. The probability of being part-time versus full-
time does not differentially change with the crisis for formal and informal workers (results
available on request).
24. To investigate the sign of the potential bias from selection into informal sector, we
have compared actual and counterfactual wage distributions, following DiNardo et al. (1996)
andChiquiar andHanson (2005). This exercise shows that workers are positively selected into
the formal employment: high-ability workers are more likely to work in the formal sector.
Part of the difference in earnings between formal and informal workers depends on this
positive selection. Our estimation strategy controls for the selection into the informal sector.
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We illustrate this identifying assumption with an example. Suppose that
workers choose between formal and informal jobs depending on some
unobserved factors, such as their level of risk aversion. For instance,
more risk-averse workers might be more likely to prefer employment in
the formal sector. Our difference-in-differences estimates remain unbiased
if differences in risk aversion between formal and informal workers remain
similar before and after the crisis. To check whether our ﬁndings are due to
changes that occurred after the crisis in the composition of the immigrant
population with respect to their risk aversion, in Table 4 we show that
results remain similar when control variables are added sequentially. We
include observables such as gender, age, and education, which are import-
ant correlates of the level of risk aversion, as previous literature shows (see
for instance Barsky et al. (1997), Guiso and Paiella (2008), and Borghans
et al. (2009)). Estimates of the coefﬁcient at the interaction term Informali
Crisist are remarkably similar across all speciﬁcations.
The table also reports a test in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005).25 After
estimating the equation using a restricted set of control variables—as in
columns 1–5, where we choose to exclude observed variables that are good
predictors of the unobserved risk aversion—denote the estimated coefﬁ-
cient of interest (i.e. the coefﬁcient at the interaction term) as r. The value
of the test is then calculated as the absolute value of f=ðr  fÞ, where f
is the coefﬁcient at the interaction term in column 6 of Table 4, that is the
estimation that includes the full set of covariates. The median value of the
test is 12: considering that age, gender, and education are variables that
are highly correlated with risk aversion—as previous literature shows—
selection on unobserved risk aversion would have to be at least 12 times
greater than selection on observables to attribute the entire difference-in-
differences estimates to selection effects. This check provides some indirect
conﬁrmation that the Crisist dummy is orthogonal to the individuals’ risk
aversion, that is that the composition of formal and informal workers with
respect to risk aversion remained very similar before and after the crisis,
which is an important identifying assumption in our regressions.
Another potential source of selection is the effect of the Great Recession
on return migration. It is worth stressing that this effect would only
strengthen our results. By deﬁnition, immigrants are the most mobile cat-
egory of workers. If during the crisis the least successful informal workers
are more likely to go back to their home country, the coefﬁcient at the
interaction term in equation (1) would underestimate the true magnitude
of the wage reduction for informal workers.
To check whether this may represent an issue in our context, in Table
A8 (Supplementary Appendix) in the Appendix we run regressions similar
to our main speciﬁcation, except that we use the information we have on
the immigrants’ intentions to return to their origin country. More
25. See Bellows andMiguel (2009) and Nunn andWantchekon (2011) for a similar use of
the test to assess the bias from unobservables using selection on observables.
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precisely, the dependent variable in these regressions is a dummy equal to
1 if the immigrant intends to return to her home country. This question is
only available in the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 waves of our survey.
Therefore we focus on the coefﬁcient at the Informali variable, and we
cannot add the interaction term Informali Crisist variable. Given that long
stay in the host country is likely to affect intentions to return (see Yang
(2006) and Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2016)), we investigate whether results
from this check differ depending on the length of stay in Italy: in column 1
of Table A8 in Supplementary Appendix there is no restriction on resi-
dence in the host country, column 2 includes individuals whose
Table 4. Wage Differential Between Formal (Regulated) and Informal (Unregulated)
Sector: Difference-in-Differences Estimation. Regressions with Gradual Inclusion of
Control Variables. Altonji et al.’s (2005) test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crisis X Informal 0.081** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.077** 0.088*** 0.093***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028)
Informal 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.15***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
Female yes yes yes
Age yes yes yes
Age squared yes yes yes
Years in Italy yes
Compulsory school yes yes yes
High school yes yes yes
Tertiary education yes yes yes
Married yes
Children abroad yes
Children in Italy yes
Altonji test 7.75 11.63 18.60 5.81 18.60
Observations 49193 49193 49193 49193 49193 49193
R2 0.282 0.306 0.302 0.285 0.327 0.344
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by province times simple occupations dummy times before/
after crisis dummy. All regressions include year dummies, occupation dummies, dummies for country of origin,
province dummies.
*p < 0:10, **p < 0:05, ***p < 0:01.
Data are from the ISMU survey (2001–13). We restrict the sample to immigrants with permanence in Italy equal to or
less than 30 years. The sample includes full-time workers only. The dependent variable is the logarithm of after-tax
wage. In columns 1–5, we exclude observed variables that are good predictors of the unobserved risk aversion. We
denote the estimated coefﬁcient of interest (i.e. the coefﬁcient at the interaction term) in these speciﬁcations as r.
The value of the Altonji et al.’s (2005) test is then calculated as the absolute value of f =ðr  f Þ, where f is the
coefﬁcient at the interaction term in column 6, that is from the estimation that includes the full set of covariates.
Whenever covariates are included, we also include their interaction with the “Crisis” dummy.
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permanence in Italy is equal to or less than 30 years (as in our benchmark
speciﬁcation), 25 years in column 3, 20 years in column 4, and 15 years in
column 5. In all speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient of interest is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding suggests that selection into return migration does
not represent an issue in our context.
Selection may also occur if during the crisis people with low ability –
which is another unobserved characteristic – switch from the formal to the
informal market. This composition effect could inﬂuence the wage dy-
namics of Figure 1 during the recession, by artiﬁcially increasing average
wages of formal workers. This is a potential problem because of the re-
peated cross-sectional nature of the ISMU data. To check whether the
composition effect represents an issue, in Figure A2 in Supplementary
Appendix we exploit the panel dimension of the SHIW dataset of the
Bank of Italy. Although the latter dataset allows us to control for unob-
served heterogeneity, it does not contain information on the informality
status. In addition to the other time-varying controls, in Figure A2 in
Supplementary Appendix we condition on individual ﬁxed effects. The
wage adjustment during the crisis is relatively similar to the one we have
in Figure 1 and Figure A1 in Supplementary Appendix, which suggests
that the pattern of average wages after the negative demand shock is not
due to selection-into-irregular-status due to unobserved ability.
Moreover, Figure A2 in Supplementary Appendix shows a lower degree
of upward ﬂexibility of wages before the recession starts.
To further explore whether the composition of migrants changed as a
result of the crisis, in Figure A3 in Supplementary Appendix we present
the evolution over time of key average characteristics (age, gender, and
education, see as well Table 4), for informal and formal workers. The
ﬁgure shows no relevant change in the composition of migrants after
the crisis starts. In addition, we perform a difference-in-differences
model where the individual characteristics of the workers are used as de-
pendent variables. Results presented in Table A9 in Supplementary
Appendix show that the crisis did not affect the composition of workers
in the informal sector, conﬁrming the robustness of our main ﬁndings.
6.5 Robustness Checks
In our benchmark speciﬁcations, we restrict the estimation sample to im-
migrants whose length of stay in Italy does not exceed 30 years. This
choice is motivated by Figure A4 in Supplementary Appendix, which
shows that the distribution of permanence in Italy is more skewed toward
the left for informal workers. This restriction aims at ensuring common
support for the distributions of formal and informal workers. In columns
1–4 of Table 5 we show that our results remain very similar when we do
not consider any restriction on length of stay in Italy (column 1) or when
we consider different maximum permanence durations: 25 years (column
2), 20 years (column 3), and 15 years (column 4). Results are comparable
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across all speciﬁcations and provide additional conﬁrmation that our ﬁnd-
ings are not driven by selection into return migration.
In columns 5–7 we present additional checks. We estimate a speciﬁca-
tion similar to our benchmark, but we exclude year 2002 (column 5). This
check is particularly meaningful because in 2002 there was a large immi-
grant regularization program that legalized about 700,000 immigrants
residing in Italy without a regular residence permit. In column (6) we
exclude year 2005, while in column (7) we consider an estimation
sample from 2006 to 2013 (rather than from 2001 to 2013 as in the bench-
mark regressions). Results are very similar throughout all robustness
checks.
In column 8, we have checked whether our ﬁndings are robust to the use
of a continuous measure of crisis. Rather than considering the recession as
a binary shock, we have estimated a speciﬁcation similar to the one of
column 1 of Table 1, but without including the InformaliCrisist inter-
action term; instead, we have added the unemployment rate (which
varies by province and year, and is computed as deviation from its
mean value 4.598) and its interaction term with the Informali dummy.
The estimated coefﬁcient of the latter interaction term suggests that one
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in the province of
residence increases the wage differential between formal and informal
sectors by 3 percentage points. At the mean value of province-level un-
employment, the wage gap is 18%.
In Table A10 in the Supplementary Appendix, we measure the wage
differential between formal and informal sector in each year by sub-
samples. Speciﬁcally, we distinguish between female and male (columns
1 and 2 respectively), unskilled and skilled workers (columns 3–4), young
and old (columns 5–6). Results are overall robust to the different subsam-
ples, although they shed additional light on the heterogeneous impact of
the crisis on different segments of the workforce. Indeed, the negative and
signiﬁcant effect of the Great Recession on the wages of informal workers
seems to have started few years later, around 2011–12, for women, un-
skilled, and older workers. Moreover, the magnitude of such effect is
smaller for these subsamples.
A potential confounding factor of our ﬁndings is the possibility that
immigrants who work in the informal sector have characteristics that
expose them to greater cyclical risk regardless the level of wage protection
they may have. For instance, Hoynes et al. (2012) ﬁnd that, in the US
context, demographic characteristics such as age, race, gender and educa-
tion, predict people’s experiences over the business cycle. To address this
potential issue, in Table A11in Supplementary Appendix we include as
control variables interactions of key demographics, country of origin
dummies, province of residence dummies, and occupation dummies with
the crisis variable. All speciﬁcations of Table A11in Supplementary
Appendix show that our results are robust to this check.
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7. Spillovers between Formal and Informal Sectors
In the analysis above we treated formal and informal sectors separately.
However, it may well be the case that these two labor markets are at least
partially integrated: some of the formal workers that lose their jobs due to
macroeconomic shocks and downward wage stickiness may be able to
reallocate to the informal sector. This would increase labor supply in
the informal sector and result in further downward pressure on informal
wages (in addition to the compression due to the demand shock).26 In this
section, we consider a parsimonious partial equilibriummodel to illustrate
these effects. We then carry out an empirical analysis of the changes in
employment in the formal and informal sectors during the Great
Recession. Finally, we use our model to reconcile the empirical ﬁndings
and estimate the degree of integration between the two sectors.
7.1 Model
We consider two imperfectly integrated labor markets: formal F and in-
formal I. We assume that % of workers are perfectly mobile between the
two sectors while the remaining ð1 Þ% cannot move across sectors. (If
 ¼ 0, the two markets are perfectly segmented, if  ¼ 1 the markets are
perfectly integrated.) We assume that the mobility shock is independent of
all other parameters. The elasticities of labor supply and demand in formal
and informal markets are ekS; e
k
D; k ¼ F; I, respectively.27
Initially, both markets are in equilibrium, and employment in formal and
informal sectors is LF and LI, respectively. Then an aggregate demand
shock shifts labor demand curves down in both formal and informal sectors
(Figure 4). We assume that the shock is proportional so in both sectors the
labor demand curves move down by x%. The wage in the formal sector is
downward sticky so the following number of workers are displaced:28
LF ¼ xeFDLF: ð2Þ
Given the imperfect integration of formal and informal markets, LF
displaced workers move to the informal sector while the others are un-
employed or leave the labor force.
Let us now consider the informal labor market. This market experiences
a decrease in demand (the labor demand curve shifts by x%down) and an
26. Another potential source of spillovers is linked to the fact that recessions may induce
workers to move to lower paying occupations, such as agriculture (Lessem and Nakajima
2015). In order to reject this hypothesis, we rerun our benchmark speciﬁcation (Table 1)
without occupation dummies. Table A12 in Supplementary Appendix shows that the coefﬁ-
cient at the interaction term between the informality dummy and the crisis variable is remark-
ably similar to the one in Table 1 in all speciﬁcations.
27. The microfoundations for labor demand and labor supply are provided in Appendix
B. See also Boeri andGaribaldi (2005) for a fully-speciﬁedmatchingmodel with heterogenous
workers and their sorting into formal and informal employment.
28. In what follows, we assume that changes are small and that elasticities are constant in
the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
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increase in labor supply (labor supply curve moves rightwards by LF
workers). Both of these shocks drive wages down. The overall reduction in
wages of the informal sector is:
wI
wI
¼ xe
I
D
eID+e
I
S
+
LF
LI
xeFD
eID+e
I
S
: ð3Þ
The ﬁrst term is the reduction in wage due to the decrease in labor
demand (driven by the macroeconomic shock), whereas the second one
Wage 
Employment 
S 
Dpre-crisis 
Dcrisis 
E*pre-crisis E*crisis 
W*pre-crisis = W*crisis 
FORMAL LABOR MARKET 
Wage 
Employment 
Dpre-crisis 
Dcrisis 
E*crisis = E*pre-crisis 
W*pre-crisis 
INFORMAL LABOR MARKET 
Scrisis 
Spre-crisis 
W*crisis!
Figure 4. Adjustments in the Formal and Informal Labor Markets. Labor supply and
demand graphs for the formal market (left) and the informal market (right). We assume
that both markets experience a negative labor demand shock. As the wage in the formal
market is rigid, this results in underemployment of workers in the formal market, some of
whom move to the informal labor market therefore shifting the informal labor supply curve
rightwards.
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is due to the increase in labor supply (the reallocation of workers from the
formal sector).
The change in employment in the informal sector is as follows:
LI
LI
¼ x e
I
De
I
S
eID+e
I
S
+x
LF
LI
eFD
eIDðeID+eISÞ
: ð4Þ
The ﬁrst term is the reduction of employment due to the decrease in
demand for labor, whereas the second term is the increase in employment
due to the increase in labor supply.
7.2 Employment in Formal and Informal Sector: Empirical Facts
In this subsection, we analyze the changes in employment in the formal
and the informal sectors after the crisis.29 Table A13 in the Supplementary
Appendix presents the regressions where the dependent variables are em-
ployment in the formal sector and in the informal sector, conditional and
not conditional on labor force participation; we also analyze the change in
the share of the informal employment conditional on employment
(column 5). We show that employment in the formal sector after the
crisis declines by 9 percentage points (7 percentage points if conditional
on labor force participation). There is no change in the informal employ-
ment (unconditional or conditional on labor force participation).
In the Tables A14, A15, and A16 in Supplementary Appendix and
Figure 5 we take a more granular look at the evolution of the formal
and informal employment controlling for year dummies and splitting
the sample by gender. In all speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcients of the year
dummies are never signiﬁcantly different from zero before the beginning
of the recession (year 2008 is the omitted category). The situation changes
after the crisis. The employment rate in the formal sector decreases by 3%
in 2009, 4% in 2010, 12% in 2011, 15% in 2012, and 16% in 2013 (relative
to 2008).30 There is no signiﬁcant change in the informal employment.
The decline in formal employment is larger for men than for women.
Female employment rates in the formal sector start decreasing signiﬁ-
cantly in 2011 with a maximum reduction of 12% in 2012, whereas male
employment is hit already in 2010 and reaches a reduction of 20% in 2013.
Importantly, in the informal sector the crisis increases men’s employment
29. To be consistent with the other estimates in the article, Tables A13–A16 in
Supplementary Appendix consider full-time employment only. In unreported regressions,
we have checked the robustness of our results to the inclusion in the estimation sample of
workers employed in part-time jobs as well. Part-time employment can be considered as a
shock absorber during crisis. Results from this check are qualitatively similar to those pre-
sented in Tables A13–A16 (Supplementary Appendix).
30. Unemployment beneﬁts and learning about job opportunities in the informal market
may explain the gradual decline in employment in the formal market at the beginning of the
crisis (see panel A of Figure 5). See Kolsrud et al. (2018) for an analysis of the dynamic
features of unemployment insurance.
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(by 3 percentage points only) while there is no signiﬁcant effect on female
rates.
7.3 Discussion and Counterfactual Analysis
Our empirical results imply three stylized facts about the formal and infor-
mal labor markets in Italy during the Great Recession. First, in the formal
sector wages do not change while employment declines. Second, in the in-
formal sector wages decline while employment does not change. Third, the
percentage change in employment in the formal sector is roughly equal to
the percentage change of the wage in the informal sector.31
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Figure 5. Employment in Formal and Informal Markets, by Gender. Employment rate
(relative to 2008) controlling for gender (in panel A), age, education, country of origin,
family characteristics, occupation dummies, provinces of residence dummies. Left-hand
side: formal sector. Right-hand side: informal sector. Dashed lines: 95% conﬁdence
interval.
Source: ISMU survey, authors’ calculations, see Tables A14, A15, and A16 in
the Supplementary Appendix.
31. More speciﬁcally, formal employment falls by 16% between 2008 and 2013 (see
column 1 of Table A14 in Supplementary Appendix) and informal wages drop by 17%
during the same period (see column 2 of Table 1).
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These facts directly give rise to two important results. On the one hand,
the informal labor market is ﬂexible—otherwise informal wages would
have not declined. On the other hand, as long as the informal labor
supply is elastic, the formal and informal markets are at least partially
integrated; if they were perfectly segmented, employment in the informal
market would have declined—while we observe no change or even an
increase in the informal employment.
Our simple model in subsection 7.1 reconciles the stylized facts from our
empirical ﬁndings in both qualitative and quantitative terms. First, con-
sider the fact that the employment in the informal sector does not change.
By setting the right-hand side in (4) to zero, we ﬁnd
eIDe
I
S
eI
D
+eI
S
¼ LF
LI
eFD
eI
D
ðeI
D
+eI
S
Þ or
LF
LI
¼ e
I
De
I
S
eFD=e
I
D
: ð5Þ
The second empirical observation is that the percentage change in the
informal wage is roughly equal to the percentage change in the formal
employment. Using equations (2) and (3), we ﬁnd:
eFD ¼
eID+e
F
D
LF
LI
eID+e
I
S
: ð6Þ
Equations (5) and (6) imply that:
 ¼ L
I
LF
eIDe
I
SðeID+eISÞ
eIDe
I
S+1
ð7Þ
eFD ¼
eIDðeIDeIS+1Þ
eID+e
I
S
: ð8Þ
Thus if we know the elasticities of demand and supply, we can estimate
the degree of integration of the formal and informal labor markets.
We will assume that the elasticity of demand in the formal sector eFD is
close to 1 (the exact point estimate from Navaretti et al. (2003) is 0.96 but
the conﬁdence interval includes 1). Equation (8) then implies eID ¼ 1 as
well.
The survey of Bargain et al. (2014) shows that the labor supply elasticity
in Italy is in the range of 0.1–0.65. Taking LI ¼ 0:15LF from the data,32
and elasticity of supply equal to 0.1, we obtain  ¼ 0:015. If the elasticity
of supply is equal to 0.65, then  ¼ 0:097. In both cases, only a very small
share of displaced formal workers move from the formal to the informal
sector.33
32. In our estimation sample, the share of workers in the informal market is 15%.
33. If we assume that the informal labor supply is perfectly inelastic, eIS ¼ 0, then our
empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the setting where formal and informal labormarkets are
perfectly separated ¼ 0. For this to be the case, the elasticity of the formal labor market
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These results allow us predicting the reaction of formal labor markets to
the labor demand shock in a counterfactual scenario should the formal
wages be fully ﬂexible. It turns out that in such a scenario the decline of
labor demand would be mostly accommodated through drop in wages
while the decrease in employment would be much smaller than in the
actual data. Indeed, let us once again assume that the elasticity of
demand is 1 and the elasticity of supply is 0.1. Then in the counterfactual
scenario the formal wages would fall by
xeFD
eF
D
+eF
S
%. Using the data from the
informal sector, we ﬁnd that if formal wages were ﬂexible, they would have
fallen by 15.5% between 2008 and 2013. On the other hand, the percentage
change in the formal employment is
xeFDe
F
S
eF
D
+eF
S
, hence 11 times smaller than the
actual observed change (
eF
S
eF
D
+eF
S
¼ 0:11+0:1 ¼ 111Þ. Instead of falling by 16% be-
tween 2008 and 2013, formal employment would have declined only by
1.5%. If we assume that elasticity of labor supply is 0.65 then the change in
formal employment would be 4.5%—still much lower than the 16% that
we observe in the data (Table A14 in Supplementary Appendix).
8. Conclusions
In this article, we study the process of wage adjustment in formal and
informal labor markets for immigrants in Italy. We show that despite
substantial growth of unemployment in 2009–13, wages in the regulated
formal labor market have not adjusted. At the same time, wages in the
unregulated informal labor market have declined dramatically. The wage
differential between formal and informal markets, which has been rela-
tively constant at 15% throughout 2001–08, has grown rapidly after 2009
and reached 32% in 2013. We show that the wage adjustment in the in-
formal sector takes place along with a shift from formal to informal em-
ployment. These results are consistent with the view that regulation is
responsible for the lack of wage adjustment and for the increase in un-
employment during recessions.
Using estimates of elasticities of labor demand and labor supply from
the existing literature, we calibrate a simple model of spillovers between
formal and informal labor markets. Our calibration implies that such
spillovers are not trivial but small: only 1.5–9.7% of workers who lost a
formal job move to the informal sector. Our model also allows estimating
the potential change in formal employment in the counterfactual scenario
where formal wages were fully ﬂexible. We ﬁnd that in this case the crisis
would have resulted in 1.5–4.5% decline in formal employment—much
less substantial than the 16% we actually observe in the data.
demand must be equal to one, eFD ¼ 1 (which is in line with Navaretti et al. (2003)); there are
no constraints on the elasticity of demand in the informal sector eID.
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To verify the validity of our empirical strategy, we run several placebo
tests, check for time-varying selection on unobservables, analyze migrants’
intentions to return to their home countries, use panel data from alterna-
tive sources to explore changes in composition, show the evolution over
time of average characteristics before and during the crisis, and control for
selection into occupations. All these checks provide support to the validity
of our empirical strategy and are consistent with the results from the
calibration exercise showing that spillovers between formal and informal
labor markets are small.
Our results are based on data on immigrants rather than the general
labor force, and therefore one should be careful in drawing general con-
clusions about regulated labor markets. We ﬁnd that our results are more
pronounced for individuals in simple occupations. These are the occupa-
tions with relatively easy substitutability between immigrants and natives,
and allow us to speculate that our ﬁndings can be generalized for low-
skilled natives as well. There is however research showing that the effects
of a recession on labor market outcomes of immigrants may differ from
those on natives (Dustmann et al. 2010). A possible reason why immi-
grants and natives differ during crisis is that foreign workers’ bargaining
power with their employers might change during the recession, if being
employed is a condition required to extend the residence permit.
Although the external validity and generalization of our ﬁndings should
then be taken with caution, we believe that the analysis on foreign workers
is interesting per se, as labor market outcomes are a good proxy of eco-
nomic integration at destination. Our estimates show how recessions in
highly regulated labor markets decrease immigrants’ employment in the
formal sector and generate a shift from formal to informal employment,
with potential implications for public ﬁnance, behavior of remittances,
and immigrant regularization programs. The link between labor market
regulation in host countries and the effectiveness of immigration policies is
a novel contribution to the literature on the economics of migration.
Although we do ﬁnd that in unregulated labor markets wages adjust
down during the recession, the 2009–13 period does not provide an ex-
haustive answer with regard to the speed and nature of this adjustment. In
fact, our data show that wages in the informal sector continue to fall
throughout the period. We cannot yet judge whether this continuing de-
crease in wages is the delayed response to the initial one-off shock or every
subsequent decrease is a reaction to the next round of aggregate demand
decline. In order to address this important question, we would need to
collect data on both formal and informal labor markets for several years
after the economy starts to recover.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization online.
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